Levitis: The Scope of the FEC Internet Rule
Jason Levitis posted a query to the Election Law Listserv today, and with his permission I am reposting it here. I think he brings up some interesting points.
Here it is (Warning - high campaign finance law geek rating):
The question is whether current law, notably the 2002 regulatory definition of “public communications,” (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 100.26.) completely exempts Internet activities from the coordination rules. This question has implications for the current rulemaking, since the need for change cannot be assessed—nor changes formulated—if the status quo is uncertain. At the hearings, a number of commissioners commented on the confusion over it.
Arguing yes—that the Internet is totally exempt, and that therefore tighter regulation is imperative—are some members of the reform community and Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (who is as far as I know the only judge to have addressed the question). According to the plaintiffs’ brief in Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28: “When Congress…directed the Commission to promulgate new regulations on coordinated communications, the only fair reading is that Congress intended for the FEC to continue to regulate political communications over the Internet, not to deregulate them. [H]owever, the Commission moved in exactly the opposite direction than Congress intended, completely exempting communications using the Internet and electronic mail from regulation under the new rules.”
Judge Kollar-Kotelly accepts this claim in her decision, writing that, “Internet communications, no matter how closely they are coordinated with political parties or a candidate’s campaign, cannot be considered “coordinated” under the FEC’s regulations.”
337 F. Supp. 2d, at 65.The press has adopted this view in its coverage, generally describing the existing rules and the Reid proposal with words to the effect of “exempting the internet from coordination rules” or “exempting the internet from regulation.” (Of course, whether press descriptions are probative of legal reality is another question.)
On the other side of the argument are other respected election lawyers, as well as my plain reading of the statute and regulations. To begin with the written law, the statute declares coordinated expenditures to be contributions without reference to whether those expenditures are Internet-related: “expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall be considered to be a contribution to such candidate.”
The regulation is more complicated, dividing coordinated expenditures into coordinated communications and other coordinated expenditures, but seems to also support the no-exemption view.: “Any expenditure that is coordinated…but that is not made for a coordinated communication…is either an in-kind contribution to, or a coordinated party expenditure with respect to, the candidate or political party committee with whom or with which it was coordinated and must be reported as an expenditure made by that candidate or political party committee….” 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b) (2004). Since current regulations exclude internet expenditures from coordinated communications (since they are neither public communication nor electioneering communications), they are either in-kind contributions or coordinated party expenditures, and thus are reportable, limited, and/or prohibited as such.
The Perkin Coie trio of Elias, Bauer, and Sandstrom all appeared to allude to these provisions in their hearing testimony. In arguing that expanding the definition of “public communications” might not be required to comport with the statute, each asserted that Internet communications are currently regulated under other provisions. The Perkins Coie view seems well supported by 11 C.F.R. § 109.20(b). But opposing views from top election lawyers and Judge Kollar-Kotelly suggest there’s more to the issue. I look forward to comments.
I think he’s right. Many roads can lead to internet activity being regulated as an “expenditure.”
Moreover, if this passage doesn’t prove that the law is overly complex, then nothing can.
I am happy to post observations and responses to Jason’s narrative.